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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Pursuant to RULE 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a final order of a
Utah District Court may be appealed. Appellate jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah
Court of Appeals pursuant to §78-2a-3(a) UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 as amended.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the court err in its Memorandum Decision and Order Dismissing Case

for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction when it failed to follow the proper procedure for
determining jurisdiction at pretrial and improperly based its ruling to dismiss upon the
defendants' mere act of placing an advertisement in a nationally circulated magazine that
was targeted towards Utah citizens?
a.

Did the court commit reversible error by failing to accept the
•--

Plaintiff s factual allegations as true?
b.

Did the court commit reversible error by failing to resolve all factual

disputes in the Plaintiff s favor?
2.

Did the court err in its Order of Dismissal by failing to determine whether

the Appellant, Clifford Lee, made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction in order
to proceed to trial on the merits?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pretrial jurisdictional decisions based on documentary evidence are reviewed de
novo by the appellate courts. Anderson v. American Society of Plastic Surgeons, 807
P.2d 825 (Utah 1990).
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The determinative statutes cited herein are § 78-27-22 and § 78-27-

24 UTAH CODE ANN. (1953, as amended).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a final order and judgment of the Honorable Donald J.
Eyre, Fourth District Court, Wasatch County, State of Utah, Specifically, this is an
appeal from the Fourth District Court's Order granting Defendants' Motion to Quash
Summons and Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction.

to

B. Course of the Proceedings & Disposition of the Case
1.

On August 20,2002 Appellant, Clifford P. Lee ("Lee"), brought suit

against Appellees ("Frank's"), Frank's Garage & Used Cars, Inc., Frank's Cars, LLC,
Frank's Used Cars, The Estate of Frank L. Harrell, Sr., Frank Harrell, Jr., and John Does
I-V, in the Fourth District Court alleging that the defendants misrepresented to him the
condition and mileage of the subject motor vehicle which was supposedly a "classic car."
(R. at 1-13.)
2.

In lieu of an Answer, Frank's filed a Special Appearance and Motion to

Quash the Summons for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. (R. at 14-15.)
3.

Mr. Lee filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to

Quash Summons and Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. (R. at 25-40.)
4.

Subsequently, Frank's filed a Reply Memorandum. (R. at 48-54.)
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5.

On January 16, 2003, the Fourth District Court issued a Memorandum

Decision wherein it granted Defendant's Motion to Quash the Summons (R. at 68-76.),
and held that (1) Mr. Lee did not present substantial evidence that Frank's had sufficient
and continuous contacts with the State of Utah that would grant Utah courts general
personal jurisdiction over the Defendants (R. at 72-73); and (2) that Frank's was not
subject to specific personal jurisdiction because it "did not purposefully direct their sales
activity in the State of Utah.. .[and] fail[ed] to satisfy the requirements of federal due
process and to comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" (R. at
69).
6.

The Court heard oral arguments on the Motion to Quash; only one

additional Affidavit was submitted by the Appellant at the hearing and the Appellees
•- -

submitted two Affidavits prior to the hearing. (R.at91.)
7.

The Court signed the Order Dismissing the Case for Lack of Personal

Jurisdiction on February 27, 2003 "pursuant to Ut.R.Civ.P.12(b)." (R. at 86.)
8.

This is an appeal from said final order granting Defendant's Motion to

Quash Summons and Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction.
C. Statement of the Facts
1.

Clifford P. Lee ("Lee") is an individual whose place of residence is Heber

City, Wasatch County, State of Utah. (R. at 12.)
2.

Upon information and belief, Frank's Garage & Used Cars is a business

entity with its principal place of business in Norfolk, State of Virginia. (R. at 12.)
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3.

Upon information and belief, Frank's Garage is a business entity with its

principal place of business in Norfolk, State of Virginia, and is a successor in interest to
Frank's Garage & Used Cars. (R. at 12.)
4.

Upon information and belief, Frank's Cars is a business entity with its

principal place of business in Norfolk, State of Virginia. (R. at 12.)
5.

Upon information and belief, Frank's Used Cars is a business entity with its

principal place of business in Norfolk, State of Virginia. It is further alleged, upon
information and belief, that Frank's Used Cars is an alter-ego of Frank's Garage & Used
Cars. (R. at 12; R. at 44.)
6.

Upon information and belief, at all pertinent times hereto, Frank L. Harrell,

Sr., along with his wife, Beatrice, was the owner and operator of Frank's Garage & Used
•

•

•

-

Cars; and The Estate of Frank L. Harrell, Sr. has an equitable interest in Frank's Garage
& Used Cars, Frank's Garage, and Frank's Cars, and Frank's Used Cars. (R. at 12.)
7.

Appellant, Mr. Lee, has a keen interest in, and is a collector of classic

automobiles. (R. at 11.)
8.

On or about September 2000, Lee purchased a Utah - Old Car Trader

Magazine at a convenience store located in Heber City, Utah. Old Car Trader Magazine
is a regional publication that lists vehicles for sale. Of particular interest to Mr. Lee was
an advertisement for a 1970 Pontiac Trans Am with 33,656 actual miles, for $15,000. (R.
at 11,44.)
9.

Frank's was the business entity that offered the car for sale. Specifically,

Frank's elected to offer the car for sale in the State of Utah by placing an advertisement
4

in the Utah—Old Car Trader publication with the intent to solicit and conduct business
with individuals residing in the State of Utah. (R. at 11, 26, 44.)
10.

Thereafter, in or about October 2000, Mr. Lee telephoned Frank's in

Norfolk, Virginia to inquire about the car. Specifically, Mr. Lee talked with Kevin Pilon,
sales manager for Frank's. (R. at 11, 44.)
11.

Pilon represented to Lee that the car had 33,000 original miles on it and that

it was in "excellent condition." (R. at 11.)
12.

Pilon and Lee engaged in several communications with one another

regarding Lee's purchase of the car. (R. at 26.)
13.

Iii or about October 2000, Mr. Lee expressed a desire to purchase the car.

(R.atl0.)
14.

On October 5, 2000, Frank's, through its sales manager Kevin Pilon, faxed

wiring instructions to Lee. (R. at 10.)
15.

On or about October 24, 2000 Lee wired transferred $ 10,000 to

Defendant's bank in Virginia Beach, Virginia to initiate the purchase of the vehicle. (R.
at 10.) A subsequent tender of $5,000 was accomplished later. (R. at 17.)
16.

On December 15, 2000, Mr. Lee received additional faxed communications

from Frank's to complete the sale of the car. (R. at 9.)
17.

Lee signed the documents where indicated and returned them to Frank's.

(R. at 9.)
18.

On or about February 23, 2001, having completed the purchase, Frank's

shipped the car from the State of Virginia to the State of Utah. (R. at 9.)
5

19.

On or about February 27, 2001, Lee took possession of the car. (R. at 8.)

20.

Upon receipt of the vehicle, Lee had a mechanic inspect the car. This

inspection revealed that the odometer had been tampered with and that in all likelihood
the car had in excess of 100,000 miles. (R. at 8.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
It is the Appellant's position that a Utah court has personal jurisdiction over a
Virginia used car corporation when the corporation solicited business in Utah by placing
an advertisement in a regionally specific, nationally circulated car magazine. The Fourth
District Court of Utah has ruled that it could not exercise jurisdiction over the Defendants
in this matter because the court's actions would not satisfy the requirements of federal
due process and failed to comport with the traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.
This Court should reverse the Fourth District Court's Order to Dismiss because
Judge Eyre incorrectly ordered that the Plaintiffs case be dismissed for lack of personal
jurisdiction. First, it erroneously ruled that a Utah court does not have personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who not only solicited business in Utah by
placing an advertisement in a nationally circulated published magazine, but had
additional contacts with the State of Utah. Second, the court reached an incorrect ruling
by failing to determine whether the plaintiff made a prima facie showing of jurisdiction
sufficient to proceed to trial on the merits.
Utah's current case law demonstrates that the Fourth District Court's Order to
Dismiss was erroneous. When determining whether personal jurisdiction exists over a
6
<

nonresident defendant during the pretrial phase, the plaintiff needs only to make a prima
facie showing of jurisdiction. In making this determination, the court should take all
factual allegations made by the plaintiff as true, unless specifically controverted by the
defendant. If the facts are in dispute, the court resolves the issues in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.
The appropriate personal jurisdiction analysis includes a two part inquiry wherein
the court first examines whether any Utah law confers personal jurisdiction over the
nonresident defendant. If it is determined that Utah law confers personal jurisdiction
over the nonresident defendant, the court then considers whether the assertion of
jurisdiction comports with federal due process requirements.
If during pretrial, the plaintiff is able to make a prima facie showing of personal
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant, then the case proceeds to trial on the merits.
Unless an evidentiary hearing is held, the plaintiff proves jurisdiction at trial by a
preponderance of evidence.
The Appellant in this case, Mr. Lee, purchased a copy of the Old Car Trader
magazine in Utah, where the publication is regularly distributed. Mr. Lee found the
advertisement placed by Frank's, which listed a classic car in excellent condition with
only 33,565 actual miles for the price of $15,000. Mr. Lee responded to the
advertisement and inquired about possibly purchasing the car. Mr. Lee then spoke with
Kevin Pilon, a sales agent for Frank's. On behalf of Frank's, Mr. Pilon made several
representations about the car therein confirming its advertised condition. Mr. Lee later
agreed to purchase the car. Subsequently, several business transactions were made via
7

telephone and facsimile. Mr. Lee wired a money payment for the car and Frank's
accepted the funds originating in Utah. Frank's then made arrangements for the car to be
shipped to Utah.
Upon arrival, Frank's had the car inspected, at which time the mechanic
discovered that the back of the odometer had clearly been tampered with, and that the
miles reflected were not the actual miles. Upon information and belief, there are well in
excess of 100,000 miles on the car, far from the 33,565 miles that Frank's originally
claimed. Judge Erye ruled that the court lacked personal jurisdiction despite the evidence
produced by Lee that Frank's had certain contacts with the forum state to assert Utah's
long arm jurisdiction. The factual allegations should have been taken as true and the
disputed facts resolved in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. When this analysis is
utilized, the Appellant clearly makes a prima facie showing that the Appellees solicited
business in the State of Utah, conducted business in this State and caused injury within
this State. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the ruling and order of the lower court
herein and find that the Appellees are subject to personal jurisdiction in the State of Utah
or remand for further proceedings consistent with the Utah Law and the UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED.

8

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPLY THE PROPER TEST TO
DETERMINE JURISDICTION AT THE PLEADING STAGE OF THE
LAWSUIT.
A.

The Plaintiff is Only Required to Make a Prima Facie Case
Establishing Personal Jurisdiction

Utah courts have adopted the guidelines established by federal courts as related to
undertaking an analysis of Rule 12 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. These guidelines
provide that a court may determine personal jurisdiction on affidavits alone, permit
discovery, or hold an evidentiary hearing, as suitable for the trial courts. Anderson v.
American Society of Plastic Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah 1990); Neways v.
McCausland, 950 P.2d 420, 332 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (Utah 1997). If a personal
jurisdiction issue proceeds on documentary evidence alone (on affidavits and/ or
discovery) without an evidentiary hearing, "the plaintiff is only required to make a prima
facie case showing of personal jurisdiction." Anderson, 807 P.2d at 827. A plaintiff
must first make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction before trial, and unless an
evidentiary hearing is held, must prove jurisdiction at trial by a preponderance of the
evidence. Id,
In Anderson v. American Society of Plastic Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825 (Utah 1990)
the plaintiff made a timely amendment to her complaint to include newly discovered
defendants. The trial court relied only upon depositions and affidavits, and granted the
Defendants motions to dismiss due to lack of personal jurisdiction.
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Upon appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court, holding that the
trial court erroneously weighed the evidence, despite the conflicts therein, and sided with
the defendant. The court announced that the plaintiff "need only have made a prima facie
showing that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Defendant in order to proceed
to trial on the merits." Anderson at 827.
In the present case, the lower court's decision to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction was based on documentary evidence alone. In its Memorandum Decision
and Order to Dismiss, the court only considered the pleadings and affidavits presented to
the court. Even though the court heard oral arguments for the Motion to Dismiss, no new
evidence was presented beyond the factual allegations and affidavits. Therefore,
applying Anderson to this case, the Appellant, Clifford Lee is only required to make a
prima facie case showing that Utah has personal jurisdiction over Frank's in order to
proceed to trial on the merits.
B.

The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error by Failing to
Accept Lee's Factual Allegations as True

When a motion to dismiss is on appeal, the court reviews the facts as they are
alleged in the complaint, accepts the factual allegations as true, and considers all
reasonable inferences drawn from the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Ho
v. Jim *s Enterprises, 29 P.3d 633, 635, 426 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, 2001 UT App. 63 (Utah
2001) (citing Lowe v. Sorensen Research Co., 779 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1989). It is well
established that when a court determines personal jurisdiction on documentary evidence
alone, the factual allegations in the complaint are accepted as true. Jim's Enterprises, 29
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P.3d at 635 (citingProm v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991); St. Benedict's Dev.
Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991)).
The proper procedural requirements for a court reviewing whether it has personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is established in Anderson v. American Society
of Plastic Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825 (Utah 1990). In Anderson, a patient appealed the trial
court's dismissal of her action against a specialized medical treatment program,
physician, and medical monitor, for a lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court based
its ruling on the pleadings and documentary evidence, including depositions and
affidavits, and concluded that asserting jurisdiction over the defendants would offend due
process.
The Utah Supreme Court, however, ruled that a court may determine personal
jurisdiction on affidavits alone, permit discovery, or hold an evidentiary hearing.
Anderson, 807 P.2d at 827. If the case proceeds on documentary evidence alone
(affidavits and discovery), the allegations made by the plaintiff are "accepted as true
unless specifically controverted by the defendant's affidavits or by depositions, but any
disputes in the documentary evidence are resolved in the plaintiff's favor." Id.
(emphasis added).
In the case at bar, the lower court failed to follow the holding found in Anderson
and did not accept Lee's uncontroverted factual allegations as true. In his Complaint and
Memorandum in Opposition, Lee has clearly asserted facts establishing that Frank's had
sufficient contact with the forum state to give Utah personal jurisdiction over the
nonresident defendants.
11

It is undisputed that in addition to placing a solicitous advertisement in a magazine
targeting car buffs in the State of Utah, the extent of the contacts by Frank's included
engaging in telephone conversations with Mr. Lee in Utah, arranging for the car to be
imported to Utah, accepting money wire transfers for payments originating in Utah, and
sending a series of facsimile transmissions to Utah to complete the purchase agreement.
See Complaint, R. at 8-12, Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash, R. at 21-22.
The lower court, however, failed to acknowledge these substantial contacts and held that
"the only contact defendants had with the forum state was the result of an inquiry made
by Plaintiff [to the nationally published advertisement.]" The court either wholly failed
to acknowledge the significant contact Frank's had with this State, or it impermissibly
engaged in a weighing of the evidence. Frank's contacts with the State of Utah extended
well beyond the mere placement of an advertisement and a subsequent response to an
inquiry. That is, Frank's contact with Utah also included other telephone conversations
beyond the initial response with Lee in Utah, the arrangements for the car to be imported
to Utah, the acceptance of money wire transfer payments from Utah, and a series of
facsimiles which were transmitted to Utah in order to complete the purchase agreement.
Therefore, this Court should hold that the trial court committed reversible error by
failing to accept the plaintiffs allegations of contact with this forum as true.
C.

The Trial Court Erred by Failing to Resolve all Factual Disputes
in Lee's Favor

To the extent that there were factual disputes in issue, the trial court also failed to
resolve said disputes in Lee's favor as required by Anderson. In Anderson, as previously
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mentioned, the court concluded that "any disputes in the documentary evidence are
resolved in the plaintiffs favor." Anderson, 950 P.2d at 422. The court should consider
"all reasonable inferences to be drawn from th[e] [factual allegations] in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff." Ho v. Jim *s Enterprises Inc., 29 P.3d 633, 634 (Utah 2001);
(citingProws v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991); St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St.
Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991)).
In its Memorandum Decision, the court held that the defendants had an
insufficient amount of contact with the forum state to satisfy the requirements of federal
due process. The affidavits and pleadings of the parties contain disputed facts as to
whether (1) Frank's initiated contact with Mr. Lee by placing an advertisement in a
regional publication of a nationally circulated magazine, with the intent to solicit the sale
of the automobile; and whether (2) Kevin Pilon acted as an agent for Frank's Garage
when he placed the advertisement in the magazine with the intent to solicit business in
other states.
>n

- .fo both the Complaint and Memorandum in Opposition, Mr. Lee alleged that

Frank's placed an advertisement in the national car magazine with the intent to solicit
business in Utah and that Kevin Pilon had the authority to act on behalf of Frank's Used
Cars, LLC and Frank's Garage, Inc.. See Affidavit of Kevin Pilon, R. at 26. In response,
Frank's alleged that Kevin Pilon's sales and marketing intention should not be imputed to
Frank's Garage.. Frank's also alleged that its contacts with the forum state did not extend
further than the mere placement of an advertisement for a car in a magazine. Frank's
stated that the defendant did not make the first "contact" in this case, but that Lee made a
13

purposeful contact when he directed his communication with the intent to purchase a
particular vehicle.
The court, in its Order and Memorandum Decision, failed to resolve these
controverted facts in Lee's favor. Instead, the lower court sided with Frank's and
characterized Frank's acts as "merely placfing] an advertisement in a nationally traded
magazine" which was insufficient contact with the State of Utah to comport with federal
due process. The court did not resolve the conflict of whether Frank's intended to solicit
business in another state in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. The record on appeal
conclusively shows that Frank's placed an advertisement in a regional magazine with the
intent to solicit business in the State of Utah. Moreover, the defendants' subsequent
course of conduct with Mr. Lee and contact with the State of Utah clearly suggests that
Frank's intended on doing business in the forum state.
This Court should hold that the trial court erred when it failed to consider the
disputed facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and incorrectly characterized the
defendant's contact with Utah to merely a response it received from Mr. Lee concerning
an advertisement Frank's placed in a nationally circulated magazine.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO DETERMINE THAT
CLIFFORD LEE MADE A PRIMA FACIE SHOWING OF
PERSONAL JURISDICTION.
A.

Utah's Long Arm Statute Confers Personal Jurisdiction over
Frank's

The proper sequence of analysis to determine whether a court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is set forth in State rel ex. W.A., 63
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P.3d 607, 463 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 2002 UT 127 (Utah 2002). In State rei. ex. W.A., the
Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that it has used various tests in the past to determine
if this forum had personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Id.at 612. In an
effort to provide clarity in the law, the court refined the personal jurisdiction analysis to
involve two considerations. "First, the court must assess whether Utah law confers
personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant." Id. The court "may rely on any
Utah statute" giving it personal jurisdiction, not just the long-arm statute. "Second,
assuming Utah law confers personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant, the court
must assess whether an assertion of jurisdiction comports with the due process
requirements of the Fourteenth amendment." Id.
In State rei ex. W.A., this Court reviewed whether the juvenile court had personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to order a judgment that terminated the
defendant's parental rights. This Court first held that a Utah law, Utah Code Subsection
78-3a-l 10(13), conferred personal jurisdiction. Id. at 612. This Court then held that
exercising jurisdiction over the nonresident parent sufficiently met the due process
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment under the status exception of the due process
analysis. Id. at 614; see Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569 (1977).
This Court must first determine whether any Utah law, including the long arm
statute, confers personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant. The Utah Code
clearly mandates that in order for this State to have personal jurisdiction, the nonresident
defendant only needs to satisfy one of the enumerated acts of the long arm statute. These
provisions include [inter alia]:
15

(1)
(2)
(3)

UTAH CODE ANN.

the transaction of any business within this state;
contracting to supply services or goods in this state;
the causing of any injury within this state whether tortuous or by
breach of warranty;
§ 78-27-24 (1953, as amended).

In Neways v. McClausland, 950 P.2d 420, 332 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (Utah 1997), the
court held that a California supplier submitted himself to this jurisdiction when he
contracted with a Utah resident to "supply goods to that resident reasonably knowing or
anticipating that these goods would be used in this State." Neways, 950 P.2d at 424. The
court ruled, pursuant to the Utah long arm statute, that the defendants' acts, including
telephone contacts between parties for the purpose of soliciting orders for the defendant's
product, the defendant's knowledge that the use destination of the product was Utah, and
the defendant's acceptance of payments originating in Utah, was sufficient to constitute a
prima facie showing ofjurisdiction over the nonresident defendant. Id. (citing Nova Mud
Corp. v. Fletcher, 648 F.Supp 1123 (D.Utah 1986)).
The court noted that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that the defendant
met the minimum contacts requirement. The nonresident defendant's actions were
sufficient to constitute the transaction of "any business within the state" or "contracting
to supply services or goods in this state" as prescribed by the UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2724 and therefore the plaintiff made a prima facie showing of jurisdiction.
In the present case, similar to the California supplier in Neways, the nonresident
defendant's actions met the statutory requirement to reasonably conclude that Frank's
actions constituted transaction of "any business within the state" and "contracted] to
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supply services or goods in this state." Frank's initiated contact with this State vis a vis a
nationally published magazine advertisement to solicit an order for a classic car.
Subsequent to Lee's response to the advertisement, Frank's communicated with Lee by
telephone and made false representations to Lee about the automobile in an effort to
entice Lee to purchase the car. An oral agreement to purchase the classic car was made
over the telephone and Frank's sent a series of facsimiles to Utah to memorialize and
finalize the agreement.
Like the nonresident supplier in Neways, Frank's knew that the use destination of
the automobile was in Utah. Frank's even made arrangements for the vehicle to be
shipped from Virginia to Utah. Frank's also, like the Neways defendant, accepted
payments that originated in Utah. Frank's course of conduct parallels that of the
defendant's in Neways wherein the court held that such alleged activities constituted the
transaction of "any business within the state" or "contracting to supply services or goods
in this state." Therefore, this Court should hold that Frank's contacts sufficiently met the
requirements to implicate Utah's long arm statute.
Even if this Court does not view the defendants acts as constituting "any business
within the state" or "contracting to supply services or goods in this state," Frank's actions
clearly fall under the third provision of the Utah long-arm statute, "the causing of any
injury within this state whether tortious or by breach of warranty." Similar to the case at
hand, the United States District Court of Utah acknowledged that fraud and intentional
misrepresentation are tortious in nature. Clements v. Tomball Ford, Inc., 812 F.Supp.
202, 205 (D. Utah 1993). The Clements court acknowledged that a nonresident car dealer
17

who misrepresents the actual mileage to intermediaries which subsequently injures a
Utah resident sufficiently meets the long-arm provision, "causing of any injury within
this state whether tortuous or by breach of warranty." Id.
In Clements, a truck buyer brought an action against an immediate seller and
Texas auto dealer alleging odometer fraud and misrepresentation of actual mileage. Id. at
204. The United States District Court of Utah held that Texas auto dealer caused an
injury in Utah by intentionally misrepresenting the automobile's actual mileage. Id. at
205. Consequently, the court found that Utah's long arm statute was applicable, pursuant
to §78-27-24(c). Id. However, the court determined that the district court lacked
personal jurisdiction over the auto dealer because the auto dealer did not purposefully
avail itself to the benefits of doing business in Utah. The court reasoned that the auto
business did not do business within the state of Utah, nor sold used vehicles within Utah,
and had not dealt with Utah customers. Id. at 206. There was no evidence to suggest that
the defendant was able to "foresee the possibility of his actions affecting the forum state."
The court noted that the foreseeability requirement that is critical to the due process
analysis is not the "mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum state"
but it is "the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State" and subsequent
reasonable anticipation of "being haled into court there." .Id.
Similar to the defendant in Clements, Frank's caused injury to Lee in Utah when it
misrepresented to Lee that the classic automobile had only 33,000 actual miles when in
fact the car has in excess of 100,000 miles. Fraud and misrepresentation are tortious in
nature, and therefore Utah's long arm statute is satisfied and personal jurisdiction over
18

Frank's is invoked. However, contrary to the defendant in Clements, Frank's conducted
business in the State of Utah and sold a vehicle to a Utah customer. Frahk? s had
connections and conducted business within Utah such that it should have reasonably
anticipated "being haled into court [here.]"
Accordingly, this Court should find that Frank's is subject to Utah's long-arm
statute pursuant to the UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-24 (1), (2) and (3) (1953, as Amended).
B.

Exercising Personal Jurisdiction over Frank's Does Not Violate
the Federal Due Process Requirements

Once it has been determined that Utah's long-arm statute confers jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant, the next step of the analysis is to ascertain whether an assertion
of jurisdiction comports with the due process requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment. State rel ex W.A., 63 P.2d 607, 612,463 Utah Ady, Rep. 13, 2002 UT 127
(Utah 2002). Courts can only exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents if that
nonresident has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state to the extent that it
would not violate the "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154 (1945). It is well
established that the personal jurisdiction due process analysis does not rely upon the
quantity of contacts, but rather the quality of the contacts. Id. at 319. Even if a
nonresident defendant has only minimal contacts with the forum state, if the suit arises
from that contact, the forum state may assert jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.
See Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Philadelphia Resins Corp., 766 F.2d 440, 444 (10th Cir
1985). It must also be sufficiently proven that the nonresident defendant "purposefully
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avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Fidelity and Casualty 766 F.2d at 445
(quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253,78 S.Ct.l228 (1958)). Additionally, the
defendant should be able to "reasonably anticipate being haled into court there/' WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodsen, 444 U.S. 286, 295-97, 100 S.Ct. 580 (1980).
Burt Drilling v. Portadrill, 608 P.2d 244 (Utah 1980)is instructive. In Burt
Drilling, the Utah Supreme Court held that Utah had specific personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant when the nonresident defendant entered into a contract to supply a
Utah corporation with goods. The court acknowledged that Utah's personal jurisdiction
over the defendant complied with due process of law. Id. In its analysis, the court
determined that the defendant's contacts were "purposeful" to the extent that the
defendant "reasonably knew that he submitted himself to this jurisdiction to answer for
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any harm caused by him." Id. at 246. The court reasoned its holding by noting that the
nonresident defendant intended to derive an economic benefit from the plaintiff and that
the defendant knew that the plaintiff was a Utah corporation. Therefore, when the
nonresident defendant entered into the contract to supply the Utah corporation with the
goods, the defendant was aware that any potential injury would occur in the State of
Utah. Based on these actions, the court held that the defendant submitted itself to
jurisdiction in the forum for any claim arising from those acts.
In the case at bar, like the nonresident defendant in Burt, Frank's knew that it was
selling the car to a Utah resident. Frank's completed business transactions in Utah,
including transmitting facsimiles to Utah in furtherance of, and to finalize the sale,
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making arrangements to transport the car to Utah, and even accepting payments that
originated in Utah. Frank's clearly should have reasonably anticipated being haled into a
Utah court after it solicited and conducted business in the State of Utah.
Therefore, this Court should hold that Utah's personal jurisdiction over Frank's
complies with the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.
C.

Lee has made a Prima Facie Showing of Personal Jurisdiction in
Order for this Case to Proceed to Trial on the Merits

The Appellant submitted the Affidavit of Kevin Pilon detailing the intent of
Frank's Used Cars to solicit business with individuals residing in the State of Utah, and
the communications made with Clifford Lee regarding the purchase of the car. The
Appellees submitted the Affidavits of Frank Harrell, Jr., and A. J. Kalfus detailing the
relationship between Frank's Used Cars and Garage, Frank's Cars, and Frank's Garage
and the ownership interests of each entity. The Appellant is only required to make a
prima facie showing to sustain a pretrial determination of personal jurisdiction. Neways
v. McCausland, 950 P.2d 420, 332 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (Utah 1997); Anderson v.
American Society of Plastic Suregons, 807 P.2d 825 (Utah 1990). In its Memorandum
Decision and subsequent Order of Dismissal, the trial court erred when it ruled that the
plaintiff failed to provide evidence that the defendants maintained substantial and
continuous contact with Utah to satisfy general personal jurisdiction, and failed to prove
that the defendants purposefully directed their sales activities with the State of Utah to
comport with federal due process.
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The Utah long arm statute was enacted to "ensure maximum protection to [its]
citizens." UTAH CODE ANN. §78-27-22 (1953 as amended). Utah's legislature has
declared that:
It is declared, as a matter of legislative determination, that the
public interest demands the state provide its citizens with an
effective means of redress against nonresident persons, who,
through certain significant minimal contacts with this state,
incur obligations to citizens entitled to the state's protection.
This legislative action is deemed necessary because of
technological progress which has substantially increased the
flow of commerce between the several states resulting in
increased interaction between persons of this state and
persons of other states.
if»
1
The provisions of this act, to ensure maximum protection to
citizens of this state, should be applied so as to assert
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the fullest extent
permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States .Constitution.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-27-22 (1953 as amended).

The United States District Court for the District of Utah recognized this legislative
intent when it held, in Nova Mud Corp. v. Fletcher, 648 F.Supp. 1123 (D.Utah 1986),
that under the Utah long-arm statute, a telephone contact between parties that gave rise to
a breach of contract and common law fraud claims was sufficient to constitute a prima
facie showing ofjurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Id.at 1126. The Nova court
examined the relationship of the defendant, the forum, and the litigation and concluded
that it was fair to assert jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant because the personal
contract gave the nonresident defendant notice that the contract could foreseeably be
enforced in Utah. Id at 1127.
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Similarly, in Neways v. McCausland, 950 P.2d 420, 332 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (Utah
1997), the Utah Supreme Court held that a nonresident defendant who contracted with a
Utah company and "purposefully undertook to supply goods that would be used in this
State" sought the protection to the laws of Utah and submits itself to Utah's jurisdiction.
Id. at 424 (citing Burt Drilling, Inc. v. Portadrill, 608 P.2d 244 (Utah 1980)). Thus, in
Neways, the nonresident defendant's alleged telephone contacts with agents in Utah made
in an attempt to solicit orders for its product together with the knowledge that his
(defendant's) product would be used in Utah, and acceptance of payments originating in
Utah were sufficient to constitute a prima facie showing of jurisdiction.
In the present case, the affidavit of Kevin Pilon and undisputed factual allegations
set forth that Frank's transacted business within the State of Utah, contracted to supply
goods in the State of Utah, and caused injury in Utah by breach of warranty. The
affidavit submitted by Appellant, together, with the undisputed factual allegations, met
the prima facie showing standard as set forth in Neways and Nova. Even though there
were conflicting affidavits regarding whether Frank's Used Cars is the alter-ego of
Frank's Garage, Inc. and whether Kevin Pilon was acting as an agent for Frank's Used
Cars, all factual disputes must be resolved in Appellant's favor in accordance with the
rules in Neways andiVova. Also, the plaintiffs allegations are accepted as true unless
specifically disputed by the defendants' affidavits or by deposition. Accordingly, this
Court should hold, as a matter of law, that the Appellant made a prima facie showing of
personal jurisdiction to conclude that the State of Utah has specific personal jurisdiction
over the Appellee, thereby reversing the lower court's Order to Dismiss. This Court
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should also hold that, as a matter of law, all factual disputes which are not clearly
controverted by the evidence should be resolved in the Appellant's favor for the purposes
of pretrial dispositive motions.
CONCLUSION
The Order of Dismissal granting the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Personal Jurisdiction is inconsistent with the current case law and legislative provisions
for the application of the long arm statute. The court's analysis did not accept the
plaintiffs allegations as true and failed to resolve all factual disputes in favor of the
plaintiff. The trial court's analysis of personal jurisdiction simply did not follow the
present case law. In addition, the trial court erred by failing to determine whether the
defendant made a prima facie showing ofjurisdiction.
•—

WHEREFORE, Clifford Lee prays that this Court reverse the ruling and order of
the trial court herein and find that Frank's is subject to personal jurisdiction in the State
of Utah, or otherwise remand this for further proceedings consistent with Utah Law and
the UTAH CODE ANNOTATED.
DATED this ^%

••>*>'*• >>.*ibA**i&-n^nn-

~

day of July, 2003.

Levin M. McDonough
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of the
Plaintiff and Appellant Clifford Lee, to be sent by United States Mail, postage prepaid,
on this

A ^

day of July, 2003, as follows:
Ms. Janet A. Goldstein
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 4556
Park City, Utah 84060
435/649 '
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EXHIBIT A

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-27-22 (1953, as amended).

It is declared, as a matter of legislative determination,
that the public interest demands the state provide its
citizens with an effective means of redress against
nonresident persons, who, through certain significant
minimal contacts with this state, incur obligations to
citizens entitled to the state's protection.
This
legislative action is deemed necessary because of
technological progress which has substantially
increased the flow of commerce between the several
states resulting in increased interaction between
persons of this state and persons of other states.
The provisions of this act, to ensure maximum
protection to citizens of this state, should be applied so
as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to
the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.

»*

EXHIBIT B

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-24 (1953, as amended).
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10a-1501,
whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in
person or through an agent does any of the following
enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an individual,
his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state as to any claim arising out of or
related to:
(1) the transaction of any business within this state;
(2) contracting to supply services or goods within this
state;
(3) the causing of any injury within the state whether
tortuous or by breach of warranty;
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any real estate
situated in this state;
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk
located within this state at the time of contracting;
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate
maintenance, or child support, having resided, in
the marital relationship, within this state
notwithstanding subsequent departure from the
state; or the commission in this state of the act
giving rise to the claim so long as that act is not a
mere omission, failure to act, or occurrence over
which the defendant had no control; or
(7) the commission of sexual intercourse within this
state which gives rise to a paternity suit under Title
78, Chapter 45a, to determine paternity for the
purpose of establishing responsibility for child
support.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT \\
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH c
CLIFFORD P. LEE,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
v.
FRANK'S GARAGE & USED CARS,
INC., a Virginia Corporation, FRANK'S
GARAGE, INC., FRANK'S CARS,
LLC, a Virginia Limited Liability
Company, FRANK'S USED CARS, a
Virginia Corporation, The Estate of
FRANK HARRELL, SR., FRANK
HARRELL, JR., an individual, and JOHN
DOES I-V,

Case No. 020500411
Judge Donald J. Eyre

-

—•

Defendants.
This matter comes before the Court on the Defendants' Motion to Quash Summons and
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. The Court has reviewed the file, considered the
memorandafiledby the parties, heard oral arguments, and being fully advised in the premises,
hereby grants the Defendants' motion.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
1. Frank's Garage, Inc., dba Frank's Garage and Used Cars, is a Virginia corporation.
Frank's Used Cars, Inc. is a Virginia corporation which Plaintiff alleges is the alter-ego of Frank's
Garage, Inc.
2. Kevin Pilon, a sales agent for Frank's Used Cars, placed an advertisement with the
automobile trade magazine Old Car Trader for the sale of a 1970 Pontiac Trans Am ("the car").

The advertisement referred to the car as a collector's item and represented that the car had
approximately 35,000 miles on it.
3. Old Car Trader is a nationally circulated trade magazine that encompasses the State of
Utah.
4. Plaintiff telephoned Frank's Used Cars in reply to the advertisement, and, after
discussing the condition of the car with Kevin Pilon and communicating to and from Utah by fax,
next day air mail and wire transfer of funds, Plaintiff agreed to purchase the car for $15,000 in an
"As Is" condition.
5. After selling the car to Plaintiff, Defendant shipped the car to consignee, E.P.
Automotive, in Salt Lake City, Utah.
6. Once the car arrived in Salt Lake City, Plaintiff requested that his mechanic inspect the
car. In the course of his inspection, Plaintiffs mechanic discovered that the back of the car's
odometer had been tampered with, and that the miles reflected were not the actual miles on the
car.
7. Plaintiff then brought suit against Frank's Used Cars and the other Defendants in this
action, arguing that the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Sections? 78-3-4 and 78-27-24 of the
Utah Code.
8. Counsel for Defendants Frank's Garage, Inc., dba Frank's Garage and Used Cars, and
Frank Harrell, Sr., now makes a special appearance, arguing that the Court should quash the
Summons and dismiss the matter for lack of personal jurisdiction.

RULING
For jurisdiction to be proper, the Court must find that it has either general personal
jurisdiction or specific personal jurisdiction in this matter. Jurisdiction over nonresidents is
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acquired pursuant to Utah's long-arm statute, which provides, in part, the following:
Any person, . . . whether or not a citizen or resident of this state,
who in person or through an agent does any of the following
enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an individual, his personal
representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to
any claim arising out of or related to:
(1) the transaction of any business within this state;
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this state;
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by
breach of warranty [. ]
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24.
Regarding the proper application of the statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22 provides that
the long-arm statute should be applied "to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to foe United States Constitution." Furthermore, the Utah Supreme
Court has addressed the differences between general and specific personal jurisdiction as follows:
General personal jurisdiction permits a court to exercise power
over a defendant without regard to the subject of the claim
asserted. For such jurisdiction to exist, the defendant must be
conducting substantial and continuous local activity in the forum
state. In contrast, specific personal jurisdiction gives a court power
over a defendant only with respect to claims arising out of the
particular activities of the defendant in the forum state. For such
jurisdiction to exist, the defendant must have certain minimum local
contacts.
Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Machine Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Utah 1992)
(citations omitted).
Because the Court must apply a separate and distinct analysis for both general and
specific personal jurisdiction, the two categories will be addressed in turn.
General Personal Jurisdiction
As cited above in Arguello, general personal jurisdiction does not exist unless the
defendant conducts "substantial and continuous local activity in the forum state." Id. In such
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situations, a court acquires jurisdiction over a defendant who conducts substantial and continuous
local activity even in situations where the activity is unrelated to the transaction which gives rise
to the cause of action. The Utah Court of Appeals has indicated that the following factors are
relevant to a determination of whether general personal jurisdiction exists:
Whether the corporate defendant is
1. engaged in business in this state;
2. licensed to do business in this state;
3. owning, leasing, or controlling property (real or personal) or
assets in this state;
4. maintaining employees, offices, agents, or bank accounts in this
state;
5. present in that shareholders reside in this state;
6. maintaining phone or fax listings within this state;
7. advertising or soliciting business in this state;
8. traveling to this state by way of salespersons, etc.;
9. paying taxes in this state;
10. visiting potential customers in this state;
11. recruiting employees in the state;
12. generating a substantial percentage of its national sales through
reveftue generated from in-state customers.
Buddensickv. Stateline Hotel Inc., 972 P.2d 928, 930-31 (Ut. Ct. App. 1998), cert,
denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999), cert, denied, 120 S. Ct. 324 (1999).
Although Plaintiff makes arguments in support of a finding for general personal
jurisdiction, the evidence before the Court does not support such a finding in this case. At the
very most, the Court could find that only one out of the twelve factors listed by the Utah Court of
Appeals would apply to Defendants: advertising or soliciting business in this state. Here, an
agent for Frank's Used Cars placed an advertisement in a national trade magazine for the sale of a
car that resulted in an inquiry to purchase by Plaintiff, a Utah resident. After terms of the sale
were reached, the agent for Frank's Used Cars shipped the car to Utah. Without any evidence
that the agent's actions were anything more than a singular occurrence, it is impossible for the
Court to conclude that Defendants maintain substantial and continuous contact with the forum
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state. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendants are subject to general personal
jurisdiction in Utah.

Specific Personal Jurisdiction
In making a determination regarding specific personal jurisdiction, Utah law employs a
"three-part inquiry":
(1) the defendant's acts or contacts must implicate Utah under the
Utah long-arm statute; (2) a "nexus" must exist between the
plaintiffs claims and the defendant's acts or contacts; and (3)
application of the Utah long-arm statute must satisfy the
requirements of federal due process.
Phone Directories Co.t\lnc. v. Henderson, 8 P.3d 256, 260 (Utah 2000) (citing
Harnischfeger Eng'rs, Inc. v. Uniflo Conveyor, Inc., 883 F.Supp. 608, 612-13 (D. Utah 1995)).
Regarding the first prong of the "three-part inquiry" listed above, the Utah Supreme Court
held that "[a]cts implicating Utah under Utah's long-arm statute include [in part]: (1) the
transaction of any business within this state; (2) contracting to supply services or goods in this
state; [or] (3) the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by breach of
warranty." Henderson, 8 P.3d at 260. However, rather than immediately addressing the first
prong of the "three-part inquiry," this Court will follow the lead of the Utah Supreme Court by
proceeding directly to a due process analysis of whether the exercise of specific personal
jurisdiction over Defendants satisfies federal due process "because any set of circumstances that
satisfies due process will also satisfy the long-arm statute." SIIMegadiamond, Inc. v. American
Superabrasives Corp., 969 P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1998).
Due process requires that a "court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant only so long as there exist 'minimum contacts' between the defendant and the forum
state." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1979) (quoting
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International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)). The requirement of minimum
contacts is established "if the defendant has 'purposefully directed' his activities at residents of the
forum and the litigation resultsfromalleged injuries that 'arise out of or relate to' those
activities." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, All U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (citations omitted).
Lastly, due process requires that exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant would not
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987).
Because an analysis of whether minimum contacts with the forum state is largely a factual
one, there is no bright line test upon which the Court can rely in deciding the issue. Furthermore,
the issue presented before the Court appears to be one offirstimpression in this jurisdiction.
However, a number of other state courts have been asked to determine the issue of minimum
contacts in situations closely related to the present matter. In the case of Marion v. Long, 325
S.E.2d 300 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985), the defendants, residents of Georgia, placed an advertisement
—•

in a national car collector's magazine. The plaintiff, a North Carolina resident, saw the
advertisement and contacted the defendant about car repairs. Id at 303. Defendants traveled to
North Carolina to discuss repairs on the car and transported the car to Georgia to work on it. Id.
at 302. In deciding this case, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that "jurisdiction cannot
constitutionally rest solely on placement of advertisements in national magazines. . .. Due process
requires more. Id at 303 (citations omitted). However, the North Carolina court did not stop
there. It also concluded that "the combination of the advertisement and the contract/visit does not
support jurisdiction . . . . The contacts shown are simply too isolated to warrant exercise of in
personam jurisdiction." Id at 304.
Another case that provides a good analysis of how a sister state has addressed the issue of
advertisements in national publications is the case ofDurkin v. Gran Turismo Jaguar, 1999 Ohio
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App. LEXIS 6120 (1999). In Durkin, the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eleventh Appellate District,
heard a case in which Gran Turismo, an Ohio corporation, advertised its automotive repair
services in a nationally distributed magazine. Id at 2. The plaintiff, a resident of Missouri, saw
one of Gran Turismo's advertisements and contacted it about doing some repair work on his car.
Id. The car was shipped to Ohio, where Gran Turismo began rebuilding the engine as well as
other repairs. Id. Throughout this process, Gran Turismo corresponded frequently with the
plaintiff via mail and facsimile. Id. When the plaintiff expressed dissatisfaction with the work
done, Gran Turismo shipped the car back to Missouri. Id. at 3. The plaintiff sued Gran Turismo
in a Missouri court and obtained a default judgment against the defendants. When the plaintiff
brought an action in Ohio to enforce the judgment of the Missouri court, Gran Turismo moved to
have the Missouri judgment vacated on the grounds that the judgment was void for lack of
personal jurisdiction. Id. at 4-5. The Ohio trial court granted Gran Turismo's motion, finding
that Gran Turismo "did not have sufficient minimum contacts with Missouri to allow for the
•--

maintenance of the lawsuit in that state." Id. at 5. On appeal, the Ohio Court of Appeals upheld
the decision of the trial court, and held that
[t]he manner in which the contractual relationship between the
parties was formed .. . does not lend itself to a finding of the
required minimum contacts. For example, it was appellant who
contacted Gran Turismo, not vice versa. Consequently, the
business did not purposefully avail itself of the laws of Missouri, but
rather simply responded to an inquiry made by appellant.... In
addition, Gran Turismo did not actively advertise its automotive
services in a Missouri-based publication. Appellant learned of the
company through an advertisement in a magazine with a national
circulation, which obviously included the state of Missouri. It
cannot be said that Gran Turismo willingly subjected itself to
Missouri's jurisdiction by advertising in a national publication.
Id at 17-18.
Considering the pleadings in the present matter, Plaintiff does not argue that Defendants
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have done anything more than the defendants in Marion and Durkin. In fact, Defendants appear
to have even less contact with the forum state than did the defendants in Marion. Having merely
placed an advertisement in a nationally circulated trade magazine, Defendants did not purposefully
direct their sales activities in the State of Utah. The only contact Defendants had with the forum
state was the result of an inquiry made by Plaintiff, to which Defendants merely responded.
Under these circumstances, if the Court were to exercise jurisdiction over Defendants in this
matter, the Court's actions would not satisfy the requirements of federal due process and would
fail to comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, !he Court hereby rules that Defendants' Motion to Quash
Summons and Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction is granted. Counsel for Defendants is
directed to prepare an order consistent with this ruling, submitting it to counsel for Plaintiff for
—•

approval and to the Court for execution.

DATED this
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 020500411 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
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JANET A GOLDSTEIN
ATTORNEY DEF
P.O. Box 4556
Park City, UT 84060
KEVIN M MCDONOUGH
ATTORNEY PLA
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PARK CITY UT 84060-3390
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JANET A. GOLDSTEIN (4326)
1375 Deer Valley Drive #208
P.O. Box 4556
Park City, Utah 84060
(435) 649-1996
Attorney for Defendants Frank's Garage, Inc.
dba Frank's Garage and Used Cars, and
Frank Harrell, Sr., Deceased
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR*WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CLIFFORD P. LEE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FRANK'S GARAGE & USED CARS,
)
INC., a Virginia Corporation, FRANK'S :
GARAGE, INC., FRANK'S CARS,
)
LLC, a Virginia Limited Liability
Company, FRANK'S USED CARS, a
Virginia Corporation, The Estate of
FRANK HARRELL, SR., FRANK
HARRELL, JR., an individual, and
JOHN DOES I-V,
Defendants.

ORDER DISMISSING CASE
FOR LACK OF PERSONAL
JURISDICTION
Civil No. 000500411
Judge: Donald J. Eyre

This matter came on for hearing on January 8, 2003, die Honorable Donald J. Eyre
presiding.

Having reviewed the file, considered the memoranda filed, heard oral

argument, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Ruling, and good cause

appearing therefor, the Court now orders as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that based upon, and in
consideration of, the factual and legal analysis contained in the Court's Memorandum
Decision dated January 16, 2003, the Motion to Quash Summons and to Dismiss for Lack
of Person Jurisdiction, filed by Defendant Frank's Garage, Inc., a Virginia Corporation,
dba Frank's Garage and Used Cars, pursuant to Ut.R.Civ.P. 12(b), is granted, and this
case is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
Dated this

day of February, 2003.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this f 3 » " d a y of February, 2003, I caused the foregoing
proposed ORDER DISMISSING CASE FOR LACK OF PERSONAL
JURISDICTION, to be served on Plaintiffs counsel by facsimile transmission, 649-2561,
and by first class mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following:
Kevin McDonough
TeschGraham, P.C.
314 Main Street
Post Office Box 3390
Park City, UT 84060
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